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ABSTRACT 
This thesis uncovers how the application of tactical deception to special 
operations can improve the likelihood of achieving mission completion. By inducing 
hesitation, confusion, and chaos into the operational environment, special operations 
forces could potentially influence and manipulate the psyche of an adversary to amplify 
friendly capabilities on the objective. Three historical case studies are presented where 
tactical deception was successfully implemented during surgical strike operations, such 
as direct action or hostage rescue missions, to evaluate how deception affects the assault 
force’s progress during the course of a mission. The author shows that the 
assault force’s advantage over an adversary is highly dependent on the duration and 
effectiveness of the deception when it is applied at the initial point of vulnerability. 
Through the use of the special operations deception curve, this thesis illustrates 
how successful tactical deception in a mission can be used to achieve relative 
superiority earlier, maintain relative superiority longer, and reduce the area of 
vulnerability experienced by special operation forces. 
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1 
I. DECEPTION IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
Throughout the history of warfare, military literature has documented notable and 
successful deceptions to shed light on its practice. Arguably one of the oldest and most 
universally accepted instruments of warfare, deception has withstood the test of time. 
Historical examples of deception have revealed its versatility and effectiveness in pivotal 
moments during the Napoleonic Wars, the American Revolutionary War, both World 
Wars, and even enigmatic operations such as the Russian Annexation of Crimea. Theorists 
have continually emphasized the significance and success of deception in military 
operations, but an attempt to elaborate on its tactical success in special operations remains 
uncharted.  
Why is deception in special operations important? Irregular warfare requires a 
shrewd mind to address complex problems and devise innovative alternatives to exploiting 
uncertainty and mitigating risk. Unlike conventional forces, special operations forces 
(SOF) function in smaller groups and are typically outnumbered, causing them to rely 
heavily on innovation to amplify their own strengths while minimizing any weaknesses. 
Innovation may come in the form of advanced technology or weaponry, but thinking of 
creative ways to outsmart an opponent can be equally or more effective during conflict. 
When applied appropriately, deception could amplify the intended friendly impacts on the 
objective by manipulating or influencing both the thought and decision-making processes 
of an adversary. Therefore, the use of deception could further mitigate the risk of 
conducting a special operation and allow special operations forces to become a more 
effective force. 
A. BACKGROUND 
While there are a plethora of uncertainties in warfare, one aspect remains certain 
for conducting a special operation: mission success ultimately depends on SOF’s ability to 
achieve and maintain relative superiority.1 Admiral (Ret.) William McRaven defines 
                                               
1 William McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare Theory & Practice (New 
York: Presidio Press, 1996), 5. 
2 
relative superiority as, “A condition that exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, 
gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy.”2 Figure 1, titled 
McRaven’s Relative Superiority Graph, illustrates the course of a special operation, and 
the factors that influence special operations forces’ ability to complete the mission. 
McRaven explains, “The area of vulnerability (AV) is a function of mission completion 
over time. The longer it takes to gain relative superiority, the larger the area of 
vulnerability, and hence the greater the impact of the frictions of war.”3 As easy as the 
condition of relative superiority is to understand, it is as equally difficult to achieve. 
Although special operations forces are no stranger to adversity, every tool available for 
conducting a special operation should be considered to ensure its success, including 
deception.  
                                               
2 McRaven, 4. 
3 McRaven, 8. 
3 
Figure 1. McRaven’s Relative Superiority Graph.4 
Within the realm of special operations literature, there are mixed opinions, from 
apprehension to conviction, about practicing the dark arts of deception. The appropriate 
application, utility, anticipated effects, and probability of success during a mission are a 
few of the concerns that shroud this illusive practice. McRaven describes deception as an 
unreliable practice for special operations and cautions its practitioners. McRaven explains, 
“Deception, when it works, either directs the enemy’s attention away from the attacking 
force, or delays his response long enough for surprise to be gained at the crucial moment.”5 
McRaven continues by providing recommendations for its utility, saying, “deception can 
be a useful tool in gaining surprise, but overreliance on deception should be avoided, and 
                                               
4 Source: William McRaven, “The Theory of Special Operations” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 1993), 10, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/14838. 
5 McRaven, Spec Ops, 17. 
4 
it is usually better to delay the enemy’s reaction than to divert his attention.”6 In this regard, 
diversions could potentially subject the assault force to more vulnerability by alerting the 
enemy if they wanted to remain clandestine. The caution expressed in McRaven’s 
argument conveys that the use of deception is enticing but its practice is difficult, and it 
should only be used if the most likely outcome is known and meets the overall intent of the 
ground force commander.  
On the contrary, a thesis titled, “Applying Deception to Special Operations Direct 
Action Missions,” Captain Edward McCleskey noted that from a study on 100 Direct 
Action (DA) missions, deception increased the success rate of special operations by 
approximately 12.1 percent.7 McCleskey’s earlier study on deception notes that out of the 
100 operations, only 28 used deception, and of those 28, only one deception failed, thereby 
proving that its application to special operations yields favorable results.8 Moreover, 
McCleskey identifies that the most commonly used method of deception for direct action 
missions was a disguise, with cover and diversion tying for second-most-commonly used.9 
This information confirms that deception is sporadically used in special operations, but the 
data confirms that it also rarely fails. With this insight, it is interesting why deception is 
not highly encouraged or used more often to achieve mission success in special operations. 
From these previous studies on deception, one major question remains unanswered: 
how can deception alter the course of a special operation to improve the probability of 
mission completion? Answering this question entails researching the positive relationship 
between deception and the course of a special operation, from initial point of vulnerability 
to mission completion. To further explore this topic and advance the contemporary 
understanding of deception in special operations, the following hypotheses were formed: 
 
                                               
6 McRaven, 18. 
7 Edward R. McCleskey, “Applying Deception to Special Operations Direct Action Missions” (master’s 
thesis, Defense Intelligence College, 1991), 65.  




1. Relative superiority can be achieved earlier with deception. 
2. Relative superiority can be maintained longer with deception. 
3. The timing and effectiveness of deception in a special operation has a direct 
relationship with the area of vulnerability incurred by special operations 
forces. 
Figure 2. The Special Operations Deception Curve Hypothesis.10 
Figure 2 illustrates each of the three hypotheses regarding the impacts tactical 
deception has on the course of a special operation mission. In the graph, the normal course 
of a successful mission without deception is annotated by the rigid solid line, starting at the 
initial point of vulnerability and ending at mission completion. Conversely, the successful 
                                               
10 Adapted from, McRaven, “The Theory of Special Operations,” 10. 
6 
implementation of tactical deception to a mission is illustrated by the “S-Curve” dotted 
lines. The dotted lines, called the deception curve, will ultimately increase the probability 
of mission completion as the overall area of vulnerability decreases over time at a faster 
rate than the normal course of a mission without deception. Depending on the overall 
timing and effectiveness, it can be hypothesized that deception will enable an assault force 
to acquire relative superiority earlier, maintain it longer, and reduce the area of 
vulnerability during the mission. 
C. SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
To uncover how tactical deception in special operations can increase the likelihood 
of mission completion, the initial approach to this study begins by defining tactical military 
deception (MILDEC) and understanding its utility in special operations. The Doctrine for 
Military Deception [Joint Pub 3–13.4] describes tactical deception as: 
Tactical MILDEC focuses on the ability to affect adversary tactical 
commanders’ ability to make accurate and timely decisions. The objective 
of tactical MILDEC is to influence the adversary commander’s capability 
to make decisions on the conduct of battles and engagements. These 
deceptions manipulate adversary commanders before and during combat. 
Tactical MILDEC serves to exploit the immediate tactical situation 
confronting the commander and should both take advantage of and support 
operational MILDEC efforts.11  
In this regard, SOF have positive control over the method and timing of deception, allowing 
them to influence the course of a mission. Other levels of deception, such as operational, 
strategic, or even political deception can influence special operations; however, they were 
excluded from this study. Tactical deception was the specific field of research for this study 
because the assault force would independently have greater control over its employment 
on the objective during the mission.  
The other important condition for limiting the scope of this study is the 
understanding of a special operation. Maintaining consistency with McRaven’s work, “A 
special operation is conducted by forces specially trained, equipped, and supported for a 
                                               
11 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Deception, JP 3-13.4 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006), 
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_13_4.pdf. 
7 
specific target whose destruction, elimination, or rescue (in the case of hostages), is a 
political or military imperative.”12 This definition describes a specific type of operation, 
otherwise known as “surgical strikes,” in which the space, time and force is limited during 
execution as opposed to conventional operations which require larger capacities of all three 
factors. 
With this collective understanding, only historical case studies where tactical 
deception directly enhanced the efforts of the assault force to accomplish their mission 
qualified. The case studies which properly met these prerequisites include Operation Aztec, 
Operation Feuerzauber, and Operation Jaque. Operation Aztec was a direct-action raid in 
Mozambique where a group of Rhodesian Selous Scouts disguised themselves as the 
enemy to destroy critical enemy infrastructure. On the other hand, Operation Feuerzauber 
and Operation Jaque were both hostage rescue missions where German and Colombian 
commandos used diversion and disguise to rescue innocent civilians in Somalia and 
Colombia, respectively. The degree in which deception contributes to mission success in 
each case varies; however, it is important not to further limit this study by degree of 
influence in order to advance the overall understanding of successful deceptions in special 
operations. 
The overall significance of this work is to advance the study of deception and 
provide its practitioners within the special operations community with an elevated 
understanding of its utility. In this study, each of the three hypotheses will be tested to 
confirm or deny if uncertainty can be viewed as a strength, and if risk, or vulnerability, can 
be reduced or mitigated by deception. Therefore, through a series of historical examples, 
this analysis will attempt to illustrate how deception can impact the course of a mission to 
provide special operations forces with an advantage over an adversary and increase the 
likelihood of mission completion. 
                                               
12 McRaven, Spec Ops, 2. 
8 
D. METHODOLOGY 
In the following chapters, three case studies are presented and qualitatively 
analyzed to illustrate the effects of successful tactical deception on the course of a mission 
where the assault force was able to achieve mission completion. In each chapter, special 
operations forces from different countries performed the operation. Through this 
multinational approach, this study will reveal different methods and practices of tactical 
deception, and how it can be used to aid friendly forces’ actions on the objective. 
In each case study, the operation will be divided into sections to elaborate on the 
events leading up to the mission and its execution, followed by an objective analysis to 
highlight the utility of deception. First, a brief introduction of the political setting as well 
as the political objective for conducting the operation will provide the reader with context 
at the beginning of each chapter. Next, a synopsis of the operation will detail the actions 
of the ground force and how they were able to successfully employ tactical deception. 
During the analysis portion of each chapter, deception will be analyzed through the 
intellectual framework of The Special Operations Deception Curve to provide a visual 
illustration of the relationship between deception, relative superiority, and area of 
vulnerability as a function of deception’s timing and effectiveness. After illustrating the 
impacts of deception on the mission, each chapter will conclude with unique findings about 








II. OPERATION AZTEC (MAY 28, 1977–JUNE 02, 1977) 
A. BACKGROUND 
In the summer of 1977, the Republic of Rhodesia, commonly known as modern-
day Zimbabwe, was in the middle of a fifteen-year harrowing civil war called The Bush 
War. The internal security concerns confronting Rhodesia were compounded by its porous 
borders, and external influence from the Russian and Chinese communist regimes. Their 
aid allowed the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), an African guerrilla and 
terrorist force, to advance south across the Zambezi River into northern and south-eastern 
Rhodesia, undermining local tribal support to the Rhodesian government.13 In response, 
the Rhodesian Security Force, augmented by the Portuguese army, commenced stability 
operations within Rhodesia’s borders to solidify its relationships with tribesmen and 
suppress terrorist insurrections.14 Stability operations aimed at suppressing the FRELIMO 
and other extremist groups, such as the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army 
(ZANLA) were met with minimal success. In a state of political extremis, Rhodesia 
adopted a new strategy with a goal of pushing the fighting out of its territorial boundaries 
and into neighboring countries. 
Rhodesian Security Forces attempted to implement an aggressive security strategy 
by dividing Rhodesia into five different operational areas. The most volatile was the south-
eastern section bordering Mozambique, known as the Repulse. When the Rhodesian 
Security Forces failed to maintain the Repulse’s territorial integrity from ZANLA forces, 
Rhodesian officials decided that attacking ZANLA and their logistical infrastructure in 
Mozambique was the only appropriate recourse.15 Fighting smaller, more agile groups of 
guerrillas proved to be difficult for Rhodesian Security Forces, and failing to maintain 
                                               
13 Ron Reid Daly and Peter Stiff, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War, 2nd ed. (Alberton, Republic of South 
Africa: Galago Publishing, 1982), 17. 
14 Reid Daly and Stiff, 17. 
15 Reid Daly and Stiff, 274. 
10 
regional security within its borders forced the Republic of Rhodesia to recognize that using 
a conventional response for combating insurgencies was insufficient. 
Striking ZANLA’s center of gravity required a competent military force that would 
be able to operate almost autonomously. They would need to travel vast distances with 
limited supplies and minimal support for an extended period of time. Selous Scouts, a 
professional guerilla force designed to operate indigenously and combat irregular threats 
for the Republic of Rhodesia, was the only force capable of accomplishing the mission. To 
limit their exposure to the mission’s hazards, the Scouts devised a unique method of 
deception by disguising themselves as enemy forces. The Scouts used enemy uniforms and 
painted their vehicles to resemble a ZANLA convoy. These deceptive measures allowed 
the Scouts to conduct a series of direct-action raids in Mozambique under the codename of 
Operation Aztec. In the final stages of the mission, the Scouts disregarded their own 
political pressures to withdraw from Mozambique, pushing past their limit of advance to 
conduct a pivotal raid in the town of Mabalane. This raid enabled Rhodesia to claim a 
significant victory against terrorism and demonstrated how tactical deception can have 
positive strategic impacts.  
B. PRELIMINARY EVENTS 
Operation Aztec was intended to inflict a series of setbacks and casualties from a 
three-pronged attack into Mozambique. The operation integrated the Scouts with the 
Rhodesian Light Infantry, the 2nd Battalion of the Rhodesian Regiment, and the Rhodesian 
Air Force. The Scouts were assigned to infiltrate behind Mozambique’s lines via a flying 
column, destroying all of the ZANLA encampments along the Mozambique railway as far 
as Jorge Do Limpopo.16 The column itself was designed to be almost entirely self-
sufficient for the mission. Led by an American who served during the Vietnam War, 
Captain (Capt.) John Murphy, the column consisted of one hundred and ten men, split into 
teams with various tasks, including a supporting element that provided mortar fire.17 Apart 
                                               
16 Reid Daly and Stiff, 274. 
17 Reid Daly and Stiff, 275. 
11 
from the other ground units, Capt. Murphy was briefed that external support for the mission 
was severely limited to two Hawker Hunter bombers, which were only available in 
extremis.18 Capt. Murphy and his men understood the risks; conducting a series of raids 
deep into Mozambique’s territory with limited resources and support was a daunting task. 
To improve their likelihood of completing the mission, the Scouts devised their tactical 
deception to create confusion in the area of operations that would last for the duration of 
the mission. 
 
Figure 3. Photograph of Major John Murphy.19 
On May 28, 1977, Capt. Murphy and his Scouts launched Operation Aztec. 
Crossing over into Mozambique territory during the period of darkness, the Scouts trusted 
that their disguises would conceal their identities and help them remain clandestine. That 
same night, the 2nd Battalion Rhodesian Regiment also launched its assault ten kilometers 
past the border, and the Rhodesian Light Infantry units were inserted into the ZANLA 
                                               
18 Reid Daly and Stiff, 274. 
19 Source: Reid Daly and Stiff, 268. 
12 
strongholds of Rio and Madulo Pan, respectively.20 Once the Scouts reached the 
Mozambique railway, the column headed south until it reached the town of Jorge Do 
Limpopo, destroying segments of railway tracks along its march. After neutralizing 
ZANLA forces at Jorge Do Limpopo, the Scouts continued to the town of Mapai with the 
Rhodesian Light Infantry following as the holding force. The Scouts and Rhodesian Light 
Infantry encountered limited resistance on their march south. 
As the Scouts traveled deeper into enemy territory, rendezvousing with other 
friendly forces became more hazardous. Two days after crossing the border of 
Mozambique, the column had reached Mapai. Clearing the Mapai airfield was time 
consuming and entailed seizing a trove of ZANLA equipment, ammunition, and vehicles 
in the process. Running low on supplies, Capt. Murphy coordinated a Dakota flight to 
conduct a logistics resupply. The plane delivered the supplies and recovered the captured 
ZANLA materials. Around 20:00, that evening, the Dakota flight was preparing for takeoff 
when it began receiving effective enemy RPG-7 and tracer fire which immediately killed 
the crew’s co-pilot, Flight Lieutenant Bruce Collocott, and grounded the airplane.21 Still 
in disguise, the Scouts’ presence at the airfield was practically unnoticeable; however, the 
Dakota flight was still on the runway in plain sight, making it an easy enemy target. The 
downed Dakota flight forced the Scouts back up north to reconsolidate with friendly forces. 
                                               
20 Reid Daly and Stiff, 274. 
21 Reid Daly and Stiff, 277–78. 
13 
 
Figure 4. The Flying Column Crossing the Mozambique Border.22 
When the Scouts drove back to Jorge Do Limpopo to unite with the Rhodesian 
Light Infantry, the overt presence of Rhodesian military forces had already met several 
terrorist counterattacks. Tired, hungry, and almost completely out of ammunition, the small 
contingent of the Rhodesian Light Infantry left behind at Jorge Do Limpopo defended 
against a series of ambushes from an estimated fifty to sixty ZANLA personnel while the 
Scouts were away.23 With limited Freedom of Movement (FoM) and no option for 
deception, the light infantry units took a heavy beating, but managed to hold their ground.  
 
                                               
22 Source: Reid Daly and Stiff, 265. 
23 Alexandre Binda and Chris Cocks, The Saints: The Rhodesian Light Infantry (Johannesburg, South 
Africa: 30° South Publishers, 2007), 224. 
14 
News of Rhodesia’s military action in Mozambique gained international attention, 
placing Rhodesian officials in a political predicament. The United Nations (UN) warned 
Rhodesian officials to withdraw from Mozambique or face UN forces.24 At a difficult 
decision point, Rhodesia’s political will to continue with the operation subsided. A UN 
response would significantly increase the level of risk to Rhodesian forces operating in 
Mozambique; therefore, they began to withdraw.  
Figure 5. Map of the Column’s Route.25 
                                               
24 Binda and Cocks, 224. 
25 Source: Reid Daly and Stiff, 275. 
15 
C. THE MABALANE RAID 
While collocated with the Rhodesian Light Infantry at Jorge Do Limpopo, Capt. 
Murphy and his Scouts received a surprising order for one last strike behind enemy lines. 
Although the order to withdraw Rhodesian forces from Mozambique was inevitable, it had 
not yet been given by Higher Headquarters (HHQ). In fact, General Peter Walls, 
Commander of the Rhodesian Forces, authorized the Scouts to push an additional twenty 
kilometers past Jorge Do Limpopo to conduct small raids in the region before returning 
home.26 Without hesitation, Capt. Murphy’s Scouts headed south for one last push.  
The Scouts used their disguise to clandestinely infiltrate deep into enemy territory 
that inhibited FRELIMO’s ability to continue fighting. At 05:00 on June 2, 1977, Capt. 
Murphy called his superior, Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol.) Ron Reid-Daly, to give him a 
status update on their progress.27 Surprisingly, the Scouts traveled 180 miles past General 
Walls’ expressed limit of advance to the town of Mabalane. During their reconnaissance 
in Mabalane, the Scouts identified and destroyed the only steam crane in Mozambique, 
significantly impeding FRELIMO’s logistic operations for several months.28 Upon the 
Scout’s withdrawal, they located and demolished several large concrete culverts that 
structurally supported the railway, completely severing the main logistics line in 
Mozambique.29 After the battle damage assessment was relayed to General Walls, he 
immediately ordered the forces’ exfiltration. The Scouts’ tactical proficiency and disguise 
allowed them to deliver a powerful blow to the enemy’s center of gravity: critical logistical 
infrastructure that supported enemy operations. The Scouts’ raid at Mabalane degraded 
enemy operations in Mozambique and ultimately gave the Republic of Rhodesia a strategic 
advantage for the remainder of the Bush War. 
  
                                               
26 Reid Daly and Stiff, 278. 
27 Reid Daly and Stiff, 278. 
28 Reid Daly and Stiff, 278–279. 
29 Reid Daly and Stiff, 279. 
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Figure 6. A Selous Scout Wearing a FRELIMO Uniform.30 
The successful conclusion of Operation Aztec demonstrated how tactical actions 
during a mission can have strategic and psychological impacts on the course of a war. The 
Scouts were able to degrade their enemies’ center of gravity by attacking their 
infrastructure, logistics, and ground lines of communication, severely degrading both 
FRELIMO and ZANLA forces’ ability to support their military operations. Summarizing 
the merit of the mission, Daly said: 
The total [enemy killed in action (EKIA)] on the raid was never accurately 
ascertained, but even the minimum figures were certainly in excess of sixty. 
The major achievements though, had not been kills . . . it had been the final 
elimination of the Mozambique railways in the Gaza Province along which 
the ZANLA terrorists, their equipment and stores had been moving to the 
Rhodesian border, the destruction or capture of a large number of military 
vehicles being used for the same purposes and the capture of a vast quantity 





                                               
30 Source: Reid Daly and Stiff, 267. 
31 Reid Daly and Stiff, 280. 
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Figure 7. Selous Scouts Enjoying the Title of the Local Paper.32 
D. ANALYSIS 
1. Mission-Enhancing Factors 
The Scouts’ use of tactical deception passively aided them throughout the duration 
of the mission. Disguised as the enemy, the Scouts were able to either remain clandestine 
up until the point of contact with the enemy or quickly disappear into the operating 
environment after an engagement. The Scouts were most vulnerable at the Mapai Airfield, 
when conducting the logistics run, and at the border of Zimbabwe when returning to base. 
During both times, the insurgents could have engaged the Scouts, but their disguise 
prevented the guerrillas from being able to discern friend from foe, costing them their 
opportunity to stop the Scouts. Had the Scouts used traditional Rhodesian uniforms, and 
Rhodesian colored vehicles, their presence would have certainly been more apparent, and 
they potentially could have faced a greater risk of being compromised. Therefore, the 
Scouts’ disguise slowed the adversary’s decision-making process, reduced their risk of 
being detected in enemy territory and aided to their element of surprise.  
                                               
32 Source: Reid Daly and Stiff, 267. 
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2. Mission-Inhibiting Factors 
The Scouts’ method of deception in Operation Aztec raises concerns about the risk 
accepted, potential fratricide and whether they were able to limit communicating their 
disguise to the intended audience. Wearing the enemy’s uniform can complicate the 
battlefield, especially working in close proximity with other friendly forces. If the 
deception is communicated too early, it could jeopardize the mission’s operational security; 
if the deception is communicated too late, it could jeopardize the Scouts’ lives. In this 
operation, the disguise used by the Scouts was intended primarily to deceive ZANLA and 
FRELIMO forces; however, they relied on other friendly units for support, making 
battlefield de-confliction both dangerous and difficult. Communicating the deception this 
way is risky in any military operation because it could introduce an opportunity for a 
friendly-fire incident. Surprisingly, the number of friendly casualties during the operation 
were few. Conducting this type of operation requires a large amount of maneuvering and 
interaction with other units, making the plan extremely complicated or executing it without 
much self-preservation. As a result, it is surprising the Scouts were not engaged by friendly 
air assets during the operation. From an aerial perspective, the sight of enemy forces on the 
ground appears as a legitimate target. Unless this method of tactical deception is augmented 
by technology where friendly forces can track friendly positions, such as GPS beacons, 
disguising oneself as the enemy poses a serious threat to life and risks mission failure.  
Most importantly, using enemy uniforms and colors as a disguise calls into question 
the morality of the Scouts, the practice of military ethics, and compliance with international 
laws. From a legal standpoint, The Law of War Manual states, “In general, the use of enemy 
flags, insignia, and military uniforms is prohibited during combat, but is permissible 
outside of combat.”33 In this regard, the Scouts may have been able to get away with using 
their disguise to move in and out of enemy territory, but using it during contact with the 
                                               
33 Department of Defense, Law of War Manual, DOD Directive 2311.01E, 5145.01, GC DOD and 10 




enemy would have violated the Law of War. Therefore, engaging the enemy under these 
pretenses is extremely unethical, and warrants serious legal consequences. 
3. Mabalane Raid Deception Curve 
The Scouts reached their initial point of vulnerability when they arrived at the town of 
Mabalane. Represented in Figure 8, the Scouts achieved relative superiority at their initial point 
of vulnerability because they arrived undetected and did not have to overcome any enemy 
defenses to reach their objective. As the Scouts easily identified and destroyed both the steam 
crane and the concrete culverts, the slope of the deception curve increases significantly, 
lowering the area of vulnerability as time on target continues. After their actions on the 
objective phase, the slope of the deception curve plateaus when the Scouts departed the 
objective. For the remainder of the mission, the probability of mission completion increases as 
the area of vulnerability decreases until the Scouts returned to Zimbabwe. Notably, the Scouts’ 
disguise lasted the duration of the mission, shown by the deception curve which remains 
dashed from their initial point of vulnerability until mission completion. 
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Figure 8. Mabalane Raid Deception Curve.34 
4. Findings on Tactical Deception 
Operation Aztec revealed one important finding about the use of tactical deception 
during a long-range surgical strike. When multiple forces operate in the same area, 
elements that use deception are likely to incur less risk than other elements that do not use 
deception. During the logistics resupply at the Mapai airfield, the Scouts were in disguise 
while the enemy concentrated their attention and firepower on the overt presence of the 
Dakota flight, resulting in a casualty and downed aircraft. In this situation, the Scouts were 
unharmed, attesting to the fact that using deception reduced risk for operating in enemy 
territory. 
                                               
34 Adapted from, McRaven, “The Theory of Special Operations,” 10. 
21 
III. OPERATION FEUERZAUBER (OCTOBER 18, 1977) 
A. BACKGROUND 
Beginning in the 1960s, the threat of transnational terrorism from violent extremist 
organizations (VEOs) became a growing concern for countries in the western world. In 
1968, a radical leftist group formed in West Germany called the Red Army Faction (RAF), 
commonly known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, escalated from political protests to acts of 
violence by the mid-1970s.35 Eventually, the RAF formed pacts with larger, more radical 
organizations, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). These 
alliances empowered smaller terrorist groups, providing them the means to convey their 
narratives through mass shootings, suicide bombings, assassinations, and airliner 
hijackings.  
In response to the emerging threat of terrorism, West Germany sought more capable 
means to strengthen its national security. In June 1972, the German police tracked and 
arrested high-ranking members of the RAF network, including the group’s founders, Ulrike 
Meinhof and Andreas Baader.36 West Germany continued to enhance its law enforcement 
capabilities by forming a new German police force called the Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG 
9), specializing in counterterrorism operations. GSG 9 grew to become a reliable and 
expeditious force, but its operational reach was initially limited to inside Germany’s 
borders.  
When a German airliner, Lufthansa Flight LH181, was hijacked by members of the 
PFLP, the situation quickly gained international attention, placing West German officials 
into a difficult political position. To save the hostages, the West German Government could 
either negotiate with the hijackers for the hostages’ release or conduct a hostage rescue 
military operation. Eventually, the opportunity to negotiate was lost when the pilot was 
                                               
35 Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Red Army Faction,” accessed March 26, 2019, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Red-Army-Faction.  
36 Chris McNab, Storming Flight 181: GSG9 and the Mogadishu Hijack 1977 (Oxford, United 
Kingdom: Osprey Publishing, 2011), 12. 
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executed, and GSG 9 was tasked with interdicting the aircraft to rescue the hostages under 
the codename of Operation Feuerzauber. In a critical moment for the West German 
Government, the newly formed counterterrorism unit relied on their training, military 
partnerships, and tactical deception to complete their mission.  
B. PRELIMINARY EVENTS 
On the afternoon of October 13, 1977, Lufthansa Flight LH181, carrying eighty-six 
passengers and five crew members departed from Palma, Majorca on what initially 
appeared to be a routine flight to Frankfort, Germany. Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft was 
hijacked by four members of the PLFP. Led by a man named Zohair Yousif Akache, a 
small group of terrorists took the aircraft by force. Among Akache was another man named 
Wabil Harb, and two women named Suhailah Sayeh and Hind Alameh. The hijackers were 
armed with two automatic pistols, plastic explosives, and six hand grenades smuggled 
onboard via an empty cosmetics case and a hollowed-out radio.37 Shortly after takeoff, the 
hijackers stormed the cockpit and forced the pilot to deviate from his planned route. As 
Harb held the aircraft’s pilot, Captain Jürgen Schumann, at gunpoint, Akache violently 
corralled the passengers into the aircraft’s economy section.38 Fearing for their lives, the 
passengers and crew onboard Flight LH181 obeyed the hijackers’ instructions. 
As Flight LH181 flew over the Mediterranean, the hijackers’ objectives were 
slowly revealed, creating an increasingly tense environment onboard for the passengers 
and crew. Unaware of their final destination, the passengers became confused and 
disoriented after the aircraft made multiple stops: first in Rome, Italy then again in Lanarca, 
Cyprus. During this stage of the hijacking, the terrorists publicly announced their demands 
and it was later published for the public. The Times, a British newspaper, revealed that 
Akache demanded the release of eleven RAF prisoners, two additional Palestinians in 
                                               
37 McNab, 16–17. 
38 Peter Harclerode, Secret Soldiers: Special Forces in the War Against Terrorism (London, England: 
Cassell & Co, 2000), 367. 
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Turkey, and fifteen million dollars.39 Instead of waiting to negotiate, Akache ordered 
Captain Jürgen to take off; the aircraft embarked on another long flight until eventually 
landing in Bahrain with only three minutes of fuel remaining.40 As the aircraft came to a 
complete stop on the runway in Bahrain it was met with heavy military resistance; however, 
instead of giving up, the hijackers announced a firm deadline of 08:00 Greenwich Mean 
Time (GMT) on October 16th to meet their demands.41 The stalemate in Bahrain gave the 
hijackers a perfect opportunity to refuel the aircraft and take off before a rescue attempt 
could be made, leaving the West German government in a difficult predicament. 
While Flight LH181 was flying over the Middle East, West German officials 
leveraged every available resource to find a viable solution. GSG 9 was alerted and tasked 
with developing a hostage rescue plan. After the hostage rescue team departed the Cologne 
Airport and landed in Cyprus, they encountered a severe breach in operational security 
(OPSEC). Through a radio broadcast, the hijackers were informed of GSG 9’s arrival, 
forcing the West German Government to construct a cover story with local media outlets 
so GSG 9 could safely relocate.42 Meanwhile, West German officials also reached out to 
the United Kingdom, seeking assistance and guidance on best practices for conducting 
hostage rescue operations. Without hesitation, the United Kingdom dispatched two 
members of the British Special Air Service (SAS), Major (Maj) Alastair Morrison and Staff 
Sergeant (SSgt) Barry Davies, to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, with a case of stun grenades 
and fifteen million dollars to support the hostage rescue efforts.43 The initial setbacks to 
security were manageable, but the international support provided by the United Kingdom 
significantly enhanced the hostage rescue team’s ability to manage the risks of the mission.  
                                               
39 “Bargaining Begins with Hijackers after Pilot is Murdered,” Times, October 18, 1977, 1, 
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Figure 9. LH181 Flight Path.44 
The hostage rescue team encountered a series of challenges and missed 
opportunities at multiple points during Flight LH181’s transit. When the aircraft landed on 
the runway in Dubai, Captain Schumann took another routine smoke break and dropped 
two broken cigars and two whole cigars outside the aircraft, indicating to the Emirates that 
there were two male and two female hijackers onboard.45 The aircraft remained stationary 
as Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid, the Dubai Minister of Defense, tried desperately to 
negotiate with the hijackers. After a lull in progress, Sheikh Mohammed finally agreed to 
let LtCol Ulrich Wegner, the GSG 9 Commander, conduct the assault, but the opportunity 
was quickly lost when the plane took off again. The next opportunity to interdict the aircraft 
came at the Aden International Airport in Yemen, but unfortunately, the hostage rescue 
                                               
44 Source: McNab, 29. 
45 McNab, 30. 
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team was denied access to land. During the layover, Akache executed Captain Schumann. 
The hijackers forced co-pilot Jürgen Vietor to fly the aircraft into Mogadishu, Somalia, and 
news of Captain Schumann’s death triggered an emotional turning point in the operation. 
The West German Government reached their threshold for acceptable risk and the cost of 
one German life provoked an immediate military response. 
C. “FIRE MAGIC” 
Soon after Flight LH181 was discovered in Mogadishu, Hans Jürgen Wischnewski, 
the German Minister of State, spoke with Somali officials to coordinate the hostage rescue 
operation. On October 17th, Major Klaus Blatte, the GSG 9 Deputy Commander, and 
twenty-eight of his men landed at Mogadishu International Airport behind Flight LH181 
while the engine noise from Somali fighter jets masked their arrival.46 Even though the 
hijackers were unaware of the hostage rescue team’s arrival, several media outlets spotted 
them and continued to report on breaking developments.47 Luckily, the hijackers were 
more focused on talking to negotiators in the airport’s aircraft control tower. The 
negotiation team tried to stall by lying to Akache, stating that his demands were being met, 
but it would take time for the RAF prisoners to be transferred to Mogadishu. They 
requested the deadline be extended to 02:30.48 Deception was critical to the hostage rescue 
team’s insertion because the distraction provided by the Somali Air Force and negotiators 
enabled the team to get close enough to their objective to execute the assault. 
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Figure 10. GSG 9’s Assault Plan.49 
After sunset, the hostage rescue team coordinated a plan that allowed them to 
approach the aircraft virtually undetected. To execute a clandestine approach, the team 
painted their faces, hands, and areas of exposed skin in black to blend into the shadows.50 
Additionally, the team wore civilian clothes instead of uniforms, and declined to wear 
helmets due to the concern of limited visibility inside the aircraft; the only layer of 
protection they did not remove was their bulletproof vests.51 When the assault force was 
ready, they consolidated at a predetermined holding area at 01:00 local, and thirty minutes 
later, they converged at an assembly point, positioning themselves directly behind Flight 
                                               
49 Source: McNab, 62. 
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LH181.52 As the team slowly approached the aircraft from the rear, the negotiators 
distracted Akache from inside the control tower with a series of questions regarding the 
procedures for exchanging the prisoners who were in route from Cairo, Egypt.53 With each 
step towards the aircraft, the runway lights on the tarmac stretched the shadows of the 
hostage rescue team, some spanning up to twenty-five feet in length, until they made it 
underneath the fuselage.54 The use of camouflage and a convincing diversion enabled the 
team to consolidate under the belly of the aircraft, placing themselves in a position to finally 
mount their assault. 
The team made their final preparations, placing double-stacked ladders to the front 
and rear on the aircraft’s port side, as well as a single ladder over both wings with two 
people at each entry point. After confirming the location of Akache and another terrorist in 
the cockpit, LtCol Wegener gave the order for the Somali troops to ignite a large fire 
approximately three hundred yards in front of Flight LH181.55 As the fire burned, it caught 
the attention of the terrorists in the cockpit and cued Maj Morrison and SSgt Davies to 
throw stun grenades over both of the wings and cockpit.56 At 02:07 local, LtCol Wegner 
gave the order to commence the assault while the hijackers were dazed and deafened by 
the stun grenades.57 The team made entry, clearing towards the flight deck and the rear of 
the aircraft simultaneously. The team sighted and engaged Hind Alamed first, then Wabil 
Harb outside the cockpit, followed by Akache in the first-class section. Suhailah Sayeh was 
engaged last while still inside the forward lavatory. During the assault, one of the terrorists 
managed to drop two grenades that detonated in the first-class section, but it did not stop 
the operation. Seven minutes after the assault, LtCol Wegener passed the code word for 
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mission complete, “Springtime.”58 After five anguishing days, the hijacking was finally 
over. 
After the hostages were safe and the hijackers were neutralized, Flight LH181 was 
secure. The mission was a success. As for the hijackers, Hind Alamed and Wabil Harb 
were pronounced dead on scene, Zohair Yousif Akache was wounded and died at a later 
time, and Suhailah Sayeh survived. All other injuries sustained by the flight crew and 
hostage rescue team were non-life threatening. The day after the raid, all eighty-two 
passengers onboard, including the remaining four crew members were safely escorted out 
of Somalia. The success of Operation Feuerzauber bolstered the legitimacy of the West 
German Government through its projection of power and enhanced hostage rescue tactics 
for the special operations community at large.  
D. ANALYSIS 
1. Mission-Enhancing Factors 
The five-day hijacking onboard Flight LH181 created a series of challenges for the 
hostage rescue team that were mitigated through the use of tactical deception during key 
phases of the operation. Among some of the most critical challenges encountered, GSG 9 
had difficulty maintaining operational security during their insertion into the country, 
remaining clandestine during their infiltration moving to their objective, and keeping the 
hostages safe until they could get close enough to neutralize the hijackers. In addition to 
deception, GSG 9 had a significant advantage over the hijackers due to their key military 
partnerships, innovative tactics, techniques, procedures, and advanced weaponry. The 
hostage rescue team was able to execute the rescue in a textbook fashion, demonstrating 
how tactical deception can improve the assault force’s ability to mitigate risk and complete 
the mission. 
During insertion, the hostage rescue team had little control over maintaining their 
operational security, creating several complications that were eventually alleviated by the 
use of tactical deception. As local media outlets provided coverage on the developing story, 
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the exposure of GSG 9’s movements continued to put the lives of the hostages and the lives 
of the rescue team in jeopardy. Under these circumstances, the risk of losing hostages was 
mitigated by developing a cover story to conceal West Germany’s intentions and the 
location of the hostage rescue team. In addition to the cover story, GSG 9’s insertion at the 
airport in Mogadishu was also masked by the Somalian Air Force. The Somalian fighter 
jets’ was an effective form of distraction. For both challenges encountered during insertion, 
tactical deception significantly lowered the chances of disclosing and detecting the hostage 
rescue team’s location; a critical factor for ensuring the hostages’ safety. 
During the rescue team’s movement to the target, they were presented with more 
difficult challenges: remaining clandestine, and getting to the hostages before the hijackers’ 
deadline. To remain clandestine, the team used passive risk mitigation measures, such as 
applying black face paint, appearing as civilians, and approaching the aircraft from the rear 
during the night. Additionally, the distraction provided by the negotiation team from inside 
the aircraft control tower was critical to the mission because it preoccupied the hijackers 
and diverted their attention away from maintaining security. The most vulnerable part of 
the mission was the infiltration phase; however, the deception techniques used by the 
rescue team allowed them to approach the aircraft undetected.  
Lastly, the most prominent challenge encountered by the hostage rescue team was 
finding a way to enter the aircraft with the element of surprise. In addition to their tactical 
expertise and the implementation of passive risk mitigation measures, deception also 
became a critical component during this part of the mission. The combination of the 
negotiation team’s false negotiations, diversion made by the fire, and the effects of the stun 
grenades created enough confusion to enable the team to enter the aircraft and seize the 
tactical advantage. Tactical deceptions used on the objective were relatively short in 
duration, extremely effective and significantly amplified the element of surprise. 
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2. Mission-Inhibiting Factors 
Tactical deception was an extremely useful tool for GSG 9, but its late 
implementation slowed the progress of the operation for the hostage rescue team. Initially, 
the hostage rescue team had difficulty acquiring the authority to conduct the assault on 
foreign soil while the aircraft was traveling abroad. Additionally, Flight LH181 made six 
different stops before its last in Mogadishu, and without communicating with anyone 
onboard, the aircraft was difficult to track. Unfortunately, during the initial stages of the 
hijacking, there were too many uncertainties and external factors to make quick decisions 
at the strategic and political levels. The concerns that weighed on government officials 
could have been alleviated if GSG 9 had proposed a deception plan that focused on 
interdicting the aircraft earlier without letting the situation develop, or become riskier. 
Therefore, an early proposal of a deception plan could have allowed them to execute the 
operation much faster if it was approved.  
3. Operation Feuerzauber Deception Curve 
The hostage rescue team first encountered their initial point of vulnerability at the 
edge of the runway when they stepped off from their assembly point. Represented in Figure 
11, the deception curve starts from the initial point of vulnerability, below the relative 
superiority line, at the beginning of the graph. The deception curve’s steady climb over 
time illustrates the decline in vulnerability and the increase in the probability of mission 
completion as the team advanced closer to the aircraft. During the infiltration phase, it took 





Figure 11. Operation Feuerzauber Deception Curve.59 
Prior to beginning their actions on the objective, the deception curve changes 
drastically as a result of the advantages gained by tactical deception and the hostage rescue 
team’s tactical proficiency. Depicted in Figure 11, the slope of the deception curve swings 
upwards to illustrate the collective advantage gained from the false negotiations, the 
diversion created by the fire, and the temporary deafness and blindness caused by the stun 
grenades. Without the advantage gained by deception, the terrorists would have had the 
opportunity to either force the plane to take off, kill more hostages, or even position 
themselves to ambush the hostage rescue team inside the aircraft. At 02:07 local, the 
hostage rescue team gained the element of surprise and made a forced entry onboard the 
aircraft, considerably reducing the area of vulnerability. 
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After the hostage rescue team made initial entry, the effects from deception allowed 
them to catch the terrorists in exposed positions, achieve relative superiority and complete 
their mission swiftly. Illustrated in Figure 11, the deception curve passes the relative 
superiority line and continues upwards until it eventually ceases being a dashed line and 
becomes a solid line, signifying that the effects of the deception had faded. Five minutes 
after the team made entry, all of the terrorists were neutralized, and the hostages were safe. 
The rapid transition from using deception to open assault had a minimal impact on the 
mission because once relative superiority was achieved with tactical deception, the hostage 
rescue team’s probability of successfully completing the mission was almost certain.  
4. Findings on Tactical Deception 
Operation Feuerzauber is a prime example of how the successful application of 
tactical deception can positively alter the course of a special operation to increase the 
likelihood of mission completion. From this case study analysis, there were four significant 
findings about the successful application of tactical deception to a hostage rescue mission. 
First, multiple deceptions can be used simultaneously, or near-simultaneously, without 
interfering with one another to create a barrage of confusion. Prior to the hostage rescue 
team’s entry onboard the aircraft, the rescuers used distraction, diversion, and cover. 
Negotiations provided the distraction, fire the diversion, and stun grenades the confusion 
so that GSG 9 could efficiently enter the aircraft and acquire relative superiority with 
neither losses to their team nor the hostages. Second, a tactical advantage can be gained 
with a deception implemented by other friendly parties, and those deceptions can be 
coordinated by a single node. For example, LtCol Wegener was able to command the 
operation and dictate the timing of deception over the radio and by signaling. Third, 
directly communicating a tactical deception to its intended audience strengthens its 
message, increasing its effectiveness and ability to be received. Each of the deceptive 
measures was specifically aimed at impacting the terrorists in the cockpit. Lastly, the 
effects of tactical deception in hostage rescue operations inevitably fade when contact is 
made with the adversary. For example, the deceptions were used primarily to ensure the 
safety of the hostages and to allow the hostage rescue team to enter the aircraft. After the 
team was onboard, the effects of the deception faded, and the team relied on their tactical 
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expertise to complete the mission. Collectively, the use of tactical deception in Operation 
Feuerzauber exemplifies the positive impact it can have on reducing risk and enhancing 
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IV. OPERATION JAQUE (JULY 2, 2008)
A. BACKGROUND
In the early 1960s, Colombia was a politically fractured state, and a band of
Marxist-Leninist guerillas, known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), used violence as a means to gain political influence.60 Operating in the sanctuary 
of the jungle, the FARC became a lucrative network, using kidnappings and the drug trade 
to undermine the legitimacy of the Government of Colombia (GOC). Among some of the 
FARC’s most notable captives, were Colombian Presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt 
and three American defense contractors named Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, and Tom 
Howes. In an attempt to gain control of the cocaine trade and recoup prisoners held by the 
GOC, the FARC used Betancourt, the three Americans, and eleven previously captured 
Colombians as bargaining chips for negotiations with Colombian President Álvaro 
Uribe.61 Unfortunately, the FARC had a reputation for brutality, and without knowing the 
location or condition of the hostages, the GOC was at a disadvantage as it lacked leverage. 
After Gonsalves, Stansell, and Howes were kidnapped, the U.S. Government 
assessed that a unilateral effort to rescue the hostages would be problematic. Locating the 
hostages was initially challenging because they had disappeared into an intricate hostage-
holding network; the hostages were chained together and marched vast distances across the 
jungle under constant armed guard.62 Under these circumstances, unraveling the FARC 
network was a significant challenge because of their illusiveness. If there was a possibility 
60 Claire Felter and Danielle Renwick, “Colombia’s Civil Conflict,” Council on Foreign Relations, last 
modified January 11, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/colombias-civil-conflict. 
61 Caroline Davies and Sibylla Brodzinsky, “Colombia Hostage Rescue: The Audacious Plot that Freed 
World’s Most Famous Captive,” Guardian, July 5, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/06/
colombia. 
62 Gregory Wilson, “A Modern Day ‘Trojan Horse’ – Operation JAQUE and the Use of Stratagem in a 
Hostage Rescue Operation,” in Art and Science of Military Deception, ed. Hy Rothstein and Barton Whaley 
(Boston, MA: Artech House, 2013), 384–385. Retrieved from 
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of rescuing the hostages, the U.S. needed to gather more information about the network’s 
inner workings. 
To enhance their efforts in locating the hostages, the U.S. began solidifying its 
bilateral military partnership with Colombia so both militaries could combine forces and 
capabilities. In 2003, the United States initiated a psychological warfare program that 
encouraged defection throughout the FARC’s ranks by offering compensation for rebels 
who provided officials with information about the hostages.63 Two years later, in May 
2005, the United States military conducted Operation Willing Spirit (OWS), a combined 
U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) and Colombian military operation that carefully 
applied pressure on the FARC hostage-holding network.64 Both U.S. and Colombian 
forces continued to escalate their efforts, but without knowing the true extent of their 
progress, it was difficult to gauge whether they were close to finding the hostages.  
 
                                               
63 Wilson, 386. 
64 Wilson, 385. 
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Figure 12. FARC Hostage Movements in 2008.65  
After years of exploiting the FARC network without much progress, Colombian 
Army commandos independently devised a clever plan to rescue the hostages using tactical 
deception. After failing to rescue the hostages using conventional means, the Colombians 
began targeting FARC leadership to gain information and access to their communications 
network. Only through a series of false messages and fabrications, was the commandos 
were able to infiltrate the network. The commandos knew that any direct engagement with 
the rebels posed serious risks. The safe recovery of the hostages required an elaborate plan. 
By devising a fictitious humanitarian organization and posing as aid workers and 
journalists, the commandos performed a daring ruse and recovered all fifteen hostages 
without any casualties. The operation was dubbed Jaque, or “Check” in English, 
referencing the chess term for cornering the opponent’s king.  
                                               
65 Source: Wilson, 387. 
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B. PRELIMINARY EVENTS 
Initially, the hostage rescue efforts appeared promising but were unsuccessful due 
to the unforeseen challenges of operating in a dense jungle environment. Knowing that the 
hostages were moving largely by foot and small boats, motion detectors were positioned 
along the riverbanks of the Apaporis River Valley to increase Colombian and American 
surveillance.66 However, the commandos had little external support and limited knowledge 
of the terrain, making ground operations in the jungle unfavorable. The FARC had a 
significant home-field advantage in the jungle because survival in this climate and 
topography was their way of life.  
When the Colombian Army attempted their first hostage rescue mission, the plan 
fell apart from the beginning. In a cordon strategy called Operation Ellipse, the Colombians 
endeavored to corral the FARC and the hostages with helicopters and ground troops losing 
the element of surprise and causing the FARC to split the hostages into three separate 
groups, disappearing into the jungle.67 The lack of success from the initial efforts at 
rescuing the hostages compelled the Colombian military to postpone any additional rescue 
attempts until they revised their concept of operations (CONOP).  
After years of tireless work and dedication, the Colombian military gained a 
significant intelligence breakthrough into the FARC network. On March 1, 2008, 
Colombian forces crossed the border into Ecuador and killed a member of the FARC’s elite 
Secretariat, Raúl Reyes, and obtained critical information on the FARC communication 
network from laptops seized during the raid.68 From the information gathered, Colombian 
intelligence operatives hijacked the FARC’s communication network, posing as radio 
operators during a routine frequency change.69 Once inside the FARC’s command and 
                                               
66 Wilson, 387. 
67 Wilson, 387–388. 
68 Wilson, 387–389. 
69 Wilson, 389. 
39 
control network, Colombian intelligence discerned their standard operating procedures and 
monitored daily FARC activities. 
To get another opportunity at rescuing the hostages, the Colombian Army needed 
to have more influence over the FARC’s daily operations. After the Colombian Army 
learned how FARC senior leadership communicated to its lower-level commanders, they 
issued fake orders to subordinate FARC commanders on behalf of the FARC’s senior 
leadership.70 The orders contained a specific set of instructions. The rebels were directed 
to consolidate the hostages, bring them to a pick-up site in the Guaviare District where a 
non-governmental organization (NGO) would transfer them via helicopter to Alfonso 
Cano, the FARC’s commander.71 Additionally, the orders also had to prevent any 
suspicion from the rebels. As a result, the instructions specified that two rebels could escort 
the hostages to Cano.72 Therefore, issuing the orders in a similar fashion to how senior 
FARC leaders communicate made the deception appear authentic and trustworthy. 
The commandos needed a flawless rescue plan, and to further deceive the rebels 
into handing over the prisoners required a credible deception. The commandos decided to 
shape their deception around an event already familiar to the rebels. Every step the 
commandos took was designed to resemble a similar hostage exchange between the FARC 
and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) earlier that year.73 A few days 
before the operation, the Colombians created a fictional website titled “Mision Humanitaria 
International,” going so far as to design an organizational symbol of a red bird in the center 
with blue leaves below and a white background.74 To be consistent, the commandos 
painted two Mi-17 helicopters completely white with red wheel wells and placed an 
                                               
70 David Luhnow, “How ‘Operation Check-Mate’ Worked,” Wall Street Journal, July 3, 2008, 
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71 Luhnow, “How ‘Operation Check-Mate’ Worked.” 
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73 Simon Romero and Damien Cave, “Bold Colombia Rescue Built on Rebel Group’s Disarray,” New 
York Times, July 4, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/04/world/americas/04rescue.html. 
74 “Hostage Ruse’s Fake website irks Group with Similar Name,” CNN, last modified July 18, 2008, 
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enlarged image of the fictional organization on the side.75 To look the part, four helicopter 
pilots ditched their uniforms for civilian clothes, and an additional six commandos prepared 
for their roles as aid workers, mock guerillas, and media correspondents.76 The 
commandos went as far as to take a week and a half of acting lessons to deliver a convincing 
deception.77 The planning process for the rescue operation was deliberate, and everyone 
involved had a specific purpose that enhanced the deception’s legitimacy. 
The commandos’ intricate deception was further enhanced because it so closely 
resembled legitimate NGOs. On July 1, 2008, Stansell remembered one of his captors 
stated that an international committee was nearby and attempting to contact them.78 
Independently, a real humanitarian organization was searching for the hostages in the 
jungle at the same time that the FARC was receiving messages regarding the plans with 
the fictional organization, supporting what the rebels were already hearing in the news.79 
The thought of being in the news or on television excited the rebels because it was an 
opportunity to spread their message and gain notoriety. The rebels started using the word 
“international” around the hostages, and told the hostages to pack their essentials and two 
sets of clothes in a knapsack.80 Unbeknownst to the rebels, both the real and fictional 
organizations were sending similar messages. The overlap in communication from the real 
and fictional organizations could have potentially confused the FARC, but fortunately it 
made it even easier for them to believe the commandos’ deception. 
C. JAQUE 
On July 2, 2008, the commandos flew overtly under their cover into the jungle via 
their two disguised Mi-17 helicopters to link up with the rebels and rescue the hostages. If 
                                               
75 CNN, “Hostage Ruse’s Fake website irks Group with Similar Name.” 
76 Romero and Cave, “Bold Colombia Rescue Built on Rebel Group’s Disarray.” 
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at any point during the mission the commandos were compromised, a quick reaction force 
(QRF) of twenty helicopters with 400 troops was ready to respond within fifteen minutes 
of notification.81 As the two Mi-17 helicopters approached an open coca field designated 
as the pick-up site, both the rebels and the commandos expected to be part of a publicized 
event. The rebels snapped into formation after hearing the sound of helicopters, assigning 
one hostage per rebel in an attempt to appear organized for their meeting with the press.82 
All parties involved put on their best performances because the events transpiring would 
be broadcasted on a national and international stage.  
 
Figure 13. Map of the Colombian Operational Environment83 
The commandos’ first interaction with the rebels was critical and would set the tone 
for the rest of the mission. When the door to the helicopter opened, out poured a group of 
multinational aid-workers wearing brown vests, led by a blond-haired man with Ray-Bans, 
                                               
81 Wilson, 390. 
82 Gonsalves, Stansell, Howes, and Brozek, 417. 
83 Source: Charles Briscoe and Daniel J. Kulich, “Operación Jaque: The Ultimate Deception,” U.S. 
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claiming to be an Australian named Daniel.84 During insertion, one commando anxiously 
donned a bib with the ICRC’s symbol.85 Without hesitation, “Daniel” walked straight over 
to César and the guerillas, followed by a reporter and cameraman holding a microphone 
and a camera with a teleSUR logo: a recognizable symbol from a Venezuelan media 
outlet.86 While the rebels were being interviewed by the commandos, posing as reporters, 
the others gathered the hostages and moved them towards the helicopter. According to 
Gonsalves, Daniel started to apply zip ties on Stansell when, “he yanked one end of the 
strap, pulled up his sunglasses for a second, and said, ‘Trust me. Trust me.’”87 At 
approximately 13:29, César, Enrique, and all fifteen hostages boarded the Mi-17 helicopter 
with the commandos.88 What originally planned to take eight minutes on the ground, took 
the commandos just over twenty-five minutes from insertion to extraction.89 The patience 
and credibility demonstrated by the commandos’ performance made their deception more 
authentic and led to a safe extraction of the hostages.  
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Figure 14. The Commandos’ Arrival at the Pick-Up Site.90 
Throughout the mission, the rebels were enthralled by the commandos’ 
performance. Shortly after take-off, the commandos jumped on César and Enrique to detain 
them. Before Gonsalves realized what was happening, a doctor yelled for him to grab the 
hypodermic needle underneath one of the seats, and when Gonsalves handed it to him, the 
doctor jammed it into César, causing him to suddenly pass out.91 Shortly after struggling 
with César, there was a loud thud towards the back of the helicopter; Enrique surrendered 
without a fight.92 By approximately 13:38, both rebels were subdued, followed by an 
immediate uproar of celebration onboard the helicopter.93 The commandos revealed their 
true identities to the hostages and their captors. Twenty minutes after leaving the pick-up 
site, the crew arrived in San José where they were received with tears of joy.94 After several 
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years of captivity, Ingrid Betancourt, Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, Tom Howes, and the 
other eleven Colombian hostages were finally free. 
D. ANALYSIS 
1. Mission-Enhancing Factors 
Operation Jaque is a leading example of how tactical deception can be deliberately 
planned and applied to a hostage rescue mission where it directly enhances the friendly 
force’s ability to complete the mission. Without deception, the mission would have been 
impossible; the hostage rescue team was outnumbered, ill-equipped, and operating in an 
unfamiliar environment. Additionally, a conventional approach to this operation would 
have heightened the risk to the hostages to an unacceptable level. Under these 
circumstances, the commandos’ deception was so successful because it was detailed, easy 
to implement, well-timed, and exploited known psychological weaknesses of the enemy. 
Therefore, Operation Jaque remains a significant milestone in special operations history 
because all of the hostages were safely recovered without any casualties and terrorist 
leaders were captured as a result of tactical deception. 
The detail that was incorporated into the commandos’ deception significantly 
improved its effectiveness by making the commandos appear as authentic members of an 
NGO. Using helicopters to meet with the rebels and painting them in a fashion similar to 
that of other NGOs was ingenious because it gave the commandos immense credibility. 
Although the helicopters did not have a recognizable NGO symbol on them, the fictional 
symbol on the side of the helicopters was large, visible and easily convincing. Moreover, 
the costumes and props used by the commandos added another visible layer of authenticity. 
If there was any additional uncertainty or hesitation about trusting the fictional 
organization, it could be researched online and contacted. Supplementing the deception 
with multiple mediums such as, visual aids, props and an internet website provided the 
necessary depth in detail to make the commandos appear like a legitimate NGO. 
The commandos’ planned to approach armed rebels completely unarmed, 
committing themselves to prepare a convincing deception that was easy to implement 
during the mission. The commandos were determined to look and play their respective 
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roles. Wearing costumes, carrying props, and acting like aid workers was an approach that 
could be practiced repeatedly and gave the commandos more confidence in their ability to 
deceive the rebels. By practicing, the commandos’ actions became routine, embodying the 
identities of real journalists, camera crews and guerillas which made their deception appear 
more credible and less dangerous. 
The commandos knew their adversary well and exploited the FARC’s 
psychological weaknesses, contributing to the deception’s success. The process first started 
by targeting the FARC’s internal communication. The commandos knew the rebels’ 
internal communication was poor and delivering messages from senior leaders was an 
opportunity to inject disinformation. The next step targeted the FARC’s desire to appear 
like a legitimate organization because the commandos knew that providing the rebels with 
a platform, such as television, would bait FARC members into exposing themselves. 
Additionally, the timing of the hostage rescue was well orchestrated and made the 
deception appear ordinary. The rebels had already conducted one hostage transfer earlier 
that year and they were hearing daily broadcasts regarding a humanitarian organization in 
the immediate vicinity. While this example of deception had many variables, the 
commandos’ consummate understanding of their enemy gave them the distinct advantage 
of knowing how the FARC would react to specific situations and perceived opportunities. 
Ultimately, the commandos’ deception was successful because they knew more about the 
FARC than the FARC knew about them.  
2. Mission-Inhibiting Factors 
Imitating a humanitarian organization was a highly convincing deception, but its 
implementation remains controversial. It can be argued that the commandos did not have 
the capacity to fight and their deception was completely justified, or that it negatively 
affected future humanitarian organization activities and special operations missions. 
Although the intent of the mission was benign, impersonating the ICRC during the hostage 
rescue was unlawful and could pose danger to future NGOs. The Law of War Manual 
states, “Certain signs, symbols, or signals reflect a status that receives special protection 
under the law of war, and thus these signs may not be improperly used. They may not be 
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used: (1) while engaging in attacks; (2) in order to shield, favor, or protect one’s own 
military operations; or (3) to impede enemy military operations.”95 Using a real 
humanitarian organization’s symbols as a form of protection could diminish a mission’s 
success, damage political relationships or relationships with other NGOs, and even 
endangered humanitarian organization activities in the future. Although highly 
successfully, the deception used by the commandos was so unique and famous, that it will 
be difficult to duplicate in future special operations missions. 
3. Operation Jaque Deception Curve 
The execution phase of Operation Jaque was short in duration, and the commandos’ 
use of deception rapidly accelerated the course of the mission. In the beginning, the 
commandos reached their initial point of vulnerability when the two Mi-17 helicopters 
arrived at the arranged pick-up site in the Guaviare District. As depicted in Figure 15, the 
deception curve starts at the initial point of vulnerability because the disguise Mi-17 
helicopters were visible to the rebels when they arrived at the helicopter landing zone 
(HLZ). The slope of the deception curve continues to increase as time progresses because 
the commandos’ disguises enhance the deception’s credibility. As a result, the 
effectiveness of the tactical deception during the commandos’ actions on the objective is 
represented by the reduction in the area of vulnerability. 
                                               
95 Department of Defense, Law of War Manual. 
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Figure 15. Operation Jaque Deception Curve.96 
As the mission progressed, the deception continued to reduce the area of 
vulnerability encountered by the commandos and persisted until they achieve relative 
superiority. As depicted in Figure 15, the deception curve intersects the relative superiority 
line when the team isolates César and Enrique and the hostages onboard the helicopters. 
When the commandos detain César and Enrique, the deception quickly fades because the 
commandos reveal their true identities. At this point, the deception curve abruptly 
transitions from a dashed line into a solid line because the deception ended. After detaining 
the rebels onboard the helicopter, the operation line continues upward, decreasing the area 
of vulnerability over time until mission completion when the team landed in San José. 
4. Findings on Tactical Deception 
After reviewing the commandos’ use of disguise and distraction in Operation Jaque, 
several findings can be concluded about the use of tactical deception in hostage rescue 
                                               
96 Adapted from, McRaven, 10. 
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missions. First, a high level of detail incorporated into the deception enhanced its 
presentation and overall appearance of authenticity. When the commandos arrived at the 
pickup site to link up with the rebels, the commandos’ portrayal of a humanitarian 
organization was strengthened by the helicopters, costumes, and their acting abilities. 
Second, the straightforward and public presentation of the deception made it appear 
genuine and normal for the rebels. For example, the symbol for the commandos’ pretend 
humanitarian organization was highly visible to the rebels and created an appeal to 
authority. Third, subtle aspects of truth helped enhance the genuineness and effectiveness 
of the deception. The addition of a real doctor for the commandos’ mission made the 
authenticity of a humanitarian organization more credible. Fourth, the effects of the 
deception dissipated shortly after relative superiority was achieved. When the commandos 
finally had César and Enrique separated from the rest of the guerillas and highly vulnerable 
onboard the helicopter, the commandos could reveal themselves and end the deception. 
Fifth, when deception becomes the only course of action (COA), commanders are 
accepting a lot of risks before the operation begins. Although the commandos’ QRF 
mitigated some risk for the rescue team, it would have placed the hostages in a more 
dangerous situation if they were activated. Conclusively, the commandos’ accepted some 
risk with their deception before the mission, but it ultimately accelerated the course of the 
hostage rescue by diminishing the area of vulnerability and reducing the time it took to 





The case studies in this thesis have demonstrated that the application of tactical 
deception to special operations is not only versatile but also can directly impact the success 
of a mission. Although there are no formulas for guaranteeing success in special operations, 
effective tactical deceptions share a common theme that dates back to ancient Chinese 
doctrine on war. In The Art of War, Sun Tzu states, “Know the enemy and know yourself; 
in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”97 In all three case studies, friendly forces 
exploited the known weaknesses of their adversaries to give them a tactical advantage, 
leading to mission completion. 
B. RESULTS OF SUCCESSFUL TACTICAL DECEPTION 
1. The Advantages 
In testing each of the three hypotheses throughout the case studies, tactical 
deception has proven to be extremely valuable for overcoming challenges in special 
operations, specifically hostage rescue missions. In each mission, special operations forces 
were confronted with a series of obstacles that could have impeded their ability to succeed. 
For example, the need to evade media coverage, infiltrating occupied enemy territories, 
meeting timelines, reducing physical exposure, entering secure structures, and interacting 
with hostile networks. These complications posed a substantial amount of risk to force and 
mission for the ground force and hostages; however, each case showed that special 
operations forces were able to mitigate those risks by using compelling and creative tactical 
deceptions. Prominently, tactical deception demonstrates to be more influential in altering 
the course of both hostage rescue missions and less influential in a long-range surgical 
strike.  
                                               
97 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1963), 
84. 
50 
Displayed in Figure 16, the deception curves from each case study are overlaid on 
one graph to compare their degree of effectiveness. Each deception curve is differentiated 
by a color-coded operational line: Operation Jaque is colored in green, Operation 
Feuerzauber in yellow, and Operation Aztec in red. Overlaying each of the deception 
curves on one graph will illustrate which deceptions were more effective at achieving 
relative superiority earlier, maintaining relative superiority longer, and reducing the overall 
area of vulnerability. Therefore, the graph will be used to support the conclusions made 
from testing each of the three hypotheses. 
 
Figure 16. Combined Deception Curves.98 
The first hypothesis tested is: tactical deception can accelerate the rate at which 
relative superiority can be achieved compared to a mission without deception. Each of the 
deception curves illustrates that a successful tactical deception assists special operations 
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forces in achieving relative superiority at one of two points. Relative superiority is either 
achieved at the initial point of vulnerability when no contact with the enemy is made or 
shortly after the initial point of vulnerability when contact is intended. Depicted in Figure 
17, Operation Aztec achieved relative superiority the fastest, Operation Jaque was second, 
and Operation Feuerzauber was the slowest to achieve relative superiority, represented by 
the shades of gray from light to dark, respectively. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
tactical deception accelerates the rate for achieving relative superiority; however, the 
relationship between achieving relative superiority and a successful tactical deception is 
highly dependent on the duration and effectiveness of the deception after its 
implementation at the initial point of vulnerability.  
 
Figure 17. Achieving Relative Superiority Time Variation.99  
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The second hypothesis tested is: tactical deception can assist friendly forces in 
maintaining relative superiority for longer compared to a mission without deception. 
Represented in Figure 18, the earlier friendly forces can achieve relative superiority, the 
longer it can be maintained during the mission. Illustrated by the shades of gray from light 
to dark, Operation Aztec maintained relative superiority the longest, Operation Jaque was 
second, and Operation Feuerzauber maintained relative superiority the shortest, 
respectively. Therefore, depending on when relative superiority was achieved, and if the 
mission was completed, it can be concluded that friendly forces can maintain relative 
superiority for a longer period of time with deception.  
 
Figure 18. Maintaining Relative Superiority Time Variation.100 
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The third hypothesis tested is: tactical deception can reduce the overall area of 
vulnerability compared to a mission without deception. Displayed in Figure 19, tactical 
deceptions that led to earlier mission completions reduced the most area of vulnerability. 
Illustrated by the shades of gray from light to dark, Operation Jaque reduced the most area 
of vulnerability, Operation Feuerzauber was second, and Operation Aztec reduce the least 
area of vulnerability, respectively. Therefore, tactical deception can reduce portions of the 
area of vulnerability but, the area of vulnerability experienced by special operations forces 
is also dependent on other tactical factors.  
 
Figure 19. Area of Vulnerability Variation.101 
2. The Limitation 
Although tactical deception increases SOF’s likelihood of mission completion, it also 
limits the course of a mission. Throughout the case study analysis, it was discovered that 
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special operations forces who achieved relative superiority earlier also experienced a lower 
probability of mission completion. Represented in Figure 20, special operations forces who 
achieved relative superiority the fastest also experienced the greatest variation in their 
probability of mission completion. Illustrated by the shades of gray from light to dark, 
Operation Feuerzauber experienced the least amount of variation, Operation Jaque was second, 
and Operation Aztec experienced the most variation in probability of mission completion. 
Comparing the long-range surgical strike to the hostage rescue missions, other additional 
limiting factors include the amount of time and kinetic activity required to complete the 
mission. Therefore, by achieving relative superiority earlier, friendly forces have to maintain 
it for longer, potentially making the course of a mission more susceptible to volatility. 
 
Figure 20. Probability of Mission Completion Variation.102 
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C. CONCLUSION 
The Special Operations Deception Curve is not a panacea for predicting tactical 
deception’s success or SOF’s ability to accomplish their mission. From the case studies, 
each of the three hypotheses was tested and four conclusions were drawn. Tactical 
deception can help SOF achieve relative superiority earlier, it can help them maintain 
relative superiority longer, and it can reduce the area of vulnerability in a mission; however, 
it can also cause a variation in the probability of mission completion. Therefore, the Special 
Operations Deception Curve should be used as a conceptual tool to help explain 
deception’s potential impacts on the course of a future mission when attempting to mitigate 
risk. 
Throughout history, deception has demonstrated its potential to alter the outcome 
of a conflict. Special operations share a unifying connection with all military operations, 
in the uncertainty that is part of the nature of war. Carl von Clausewitz theorized about 
uncertainty in war saying, “Friction, as we choose to call it, is the force that makes the 
apparently easy so difficult.”103 Naturally, the frictions of war cannot be eliminated, and 
special operations forces will always experience a degree of uncertainty during an 
operation. However, the way in which SOF chooses to address these frictions can have a 
direct impact on the outcome of an operation. In this regard, deception is one of the many 
tools that can provide an advantage. By exploiting the weaknesses of an adversary via 
tactical deception, SOF can potentially displace the frictions of war, forcing the adversary 
to experience additional uncertainty, and mitigate friction, resulting in a more favorable 
outcome for a mission. 
Using deception to exploit the thought and decision-making processes of the 
adversary is a powerful tool that must always be carefully considered and implemented. 
Although the application of deception to special operations may not always be appropriate 
or successful, the understanding of its utility will quickly atrophy if it is neither studied nor 
practiced. Therefore, the study of deception in special operations will always remain 
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important to the special operations community because it will continue to teach military 
members and scholars alike different ways to implement an old art in modern warfare. 
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